01477nam a2200241Ia 4500 CTU_168353 210402s9999 xx 000 0 und d 37.57 342.73052 L514 Lovell, George I Legislative Deferrals : Statutory Ambiguity, Judicial Power, and American Democracy George I. Lovell Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2003 United States judges are criticized for making law when they should be following the laws made by elected officials. This book argues that much of the blame for judicial policymaking lies with elected officials. Legislators sometimes deliberately allow judges to make policy decisions because they want to avoid blame for making difficult choices. To demonstrate the importance of legislative deference, this study reexamines dramatic confrontations between Congress and the Supreme Court over labor policy in the early twentieth century. Câu hỏi chính trị và quyền lực tư pháp,Thẩm phán-thực thi pháp luật,Phân chia quyền lực,Political questions and judicial power,Judge-made law,Legislative power,Separation of powers Quyền lập pháp Mỹ,Mỹ,Mỹ,Mỹ,United States,United Sates,United Sates,United States Lan Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Cần Thơ