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  <controlfield tag="001">CTU_174125</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">210402s9999    xx            000 0 und d</controlfield>
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   <subfield code="c">37</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">338.0951</subfield>
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   <subfield code="b">L735</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Lin, Yi-min.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Between politics and markets :</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2="0">
   <subfield code="b">firms, competition, and institutional change in post-Mao China</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2="0">
   <subfield code="c">Yi-min Lin</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Cambridge,New York</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="c">2001</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Between Politics and Markets examines how the decline of central planning was related to the rise of two markets: an economic market for the exchange of products and factors, and a political market for the diversion to private interests of state assets and authorities. Lin reveals their concurrent development through an account of how industrial firms competed their way out of the plan through exchange relations with one another and with state agents. He argues that the two markets were mutually accommodating, that the political market grew also from a decay of the state's self-monitoring capacity, and that economic actors' competition for special favors from state agents constituted a major driving force of economic institutional change. The findings presented in the book illustrate that concrete markets for products and factors need not mimic 'the invisible hand', nor is there a linear correlation between their expansion and the rise of a legal-rational state.</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Mixed economy,Nền kinh tế hỗn hợp,Trung Quốc,Trung Quốc</subfield>
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   <subfield code="x">Chính quyền và chính trị,Điều kiện kinh tế</subfield>
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   <subfield code="y">1976-2002,1976-2000</subfield>
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   <subfield code="z">China,Trung Quốc</subfield>
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   <subfield code="i">Năm</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Cần Thơ</subfield>
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