FAO economic and social development paper; N.132 The economics of international agreements for the protection of environmental and agricultural services

This paper is a contribution towards understanding when cooperation could improve on nationalistic policy, in what areas cooperation has already been manifested and the determinants of successful cooperation. Contrary to the allegory of the commons, this paper shows that cooperative outcomes can be...

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Chi tiết về thư mục
Tác giả chính: Scott Barrett
Định dạng: Sách
Ngôn ngữ:Undetermined
Được phát hành: Rome FAO 1995
Những chủ đề:
Các nhãn: Thêm thẻ
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Thư viện lưu trữ: Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Cần Thơ
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082 |a 330 
082 |b F218/N.132 
100 |a Scott Barrett 
245 0 |a FAO economic and social development paper; N.132 
245 4 |b The economics of international agreements for the protection of environmental and agricultural services 
245 0 |c Scott Barrett, FAO 
260 |a Rome 
260 |b FAO 
260 |c 1995 
520 |a This paper is a contribution towards understanding when cooperation could improve on nationalistic policy, in what areas cooperation has already been manifested and the determinants of successful cooperation. Contrary to the allegory of the commons, this paper shows that cooperative outcomes can be sustained under certain circumstance. This is encouraging, although the paper also argues that copperation has not always been successful and identifies the features of certain problems-such as the number of countries sharing a resource-that help to explain why. While offering an analytical framework for examining cooperation, the paper also throws up a challenge. The chanlenge is to devise means for sustaining cooperation, even when the circumstances would seem not to support such an outcome. 
650 |a economic development - social aspects 
904 |i Nguyễn Quang Điền, 970530 
980 |a Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Cần Thơ