From mao to market : Rent seeking, local protectionism, and marketization in China

Andrew Wedeman argues that economic reform in China succeeded because government failed to prevent local officials from forcing prices to market levels. Reformers opted for a hybrid system of price controls in the 1980s, wherein commodities had both fixed and floating prices. Depressed fixed prices...

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Tác giả chính: Wedeman, Andrew Hall
Định dạng: Sách
Ngôn ngữ:Undetermined
Được phát hành: Cambridge, U.K. Cambridge University Press 2003
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Thư viện lưu trữ: Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Cần Thơ
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520 |a Andrew Wedeman argues that economic reform in China succeeded because government failed to prevent local officials from forcing prices to market levels. Reformers opted for a hybrid system of price controls in the 1980s, wherein commodities had both fixed and floating prices. Depressed fixed prices led to "resource wars," as localities vied for control over undervalued commodities while inflated prices fueled an investment boom that saturated markets and led to import barriers. Although local rent seeking and protectionism appeared to carve up the economy, they had actually cleared the way for sweeping reforms. 
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