The co-operative game theory of the firm
This highly original book challenges the orthodox economic theory of the firm as a mysterious "black box" whose internal design is unknown and irrelevant and which operates solely to maximize shareholder profit. Instead, the author proposes a new "cooperative game theory," in whi...
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| Format: | Livre |
| Langue: | Undetermined |
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Oxford, England
Clarendon Press
1984
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| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Cần Thơ |
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| Résumé: | This highly original book challenges the orthodox economic theory of the firm as a mysterious "black box" whose internal design is unknown and irrelevant and which operates solely to maximize shareholder profit. Instead, the author proposes a new "cooperative game theory," in which the firm is a coalition of shareholders and employees, with its market behavior and internal distribution the result of a cooperative game (bargaining). Aoki tests his model against existing industrial structures, including the Anglo-American unionized firm, the German/Swedish co-determination firm, and the American non-union or Japanese firm. |
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