Epistemic injustice power and the ethics of knowing

The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, vi...

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Dades bibliogràfiques
Autor principal: Fricker, Miranda
Altres autors: Miranda Fricker
Idioma:Undetermined
English
Publicat: Oxford,New York Oxford University Press 2007
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Thư viện lưu trữ: Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Trà Vinh
Descripció
Sumari:The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice
Descripció física:x, 188 p.
23 cm
ISBN:0198237901
9780198237907