Guilty robots, happy dogs the question of alien minds
Can we ever know what non-human minds are really like? How different are human minds from the minds of animals or robots? In Guilty Robots and Happy Dogs, David McFarland offers an accessible exploration of these and many other intriguing questions, questions that illuminate our understanding the hu...
محفوظ في:
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| اللغة: | Undetermined English |
| منشور في: |
Oxford,New York
Oxford University Press
2008
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| الموضوعات: | |
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إضافة وسم
لا توجد وسوم, كن أول من يضع وسما على هذه التسجيلة!
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| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Trà Vinh |
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| الملخص: | Can we ever know what non-human minds are really like? How different are human minds from the minds of animals or robots? In Guilty Robots and Happy Dogs, David McFarland offers an accessible exploration of these and many other intriguing questions, questions that illuminate our understanding the human mind and its limits in knowing and imagining other minds. In exploring these issues, McFarland looks not only at philosophy, but also examines new evidence from the science of animal behavior, plus the latest developments in robotics and artificial intelligence, to show how many different--and often quite surprising--conclusions we can draw about the nature of minds "alien" to our own. Can robots ever feel guilty? Can dogs feel happy? Answering these questions is not simply an abstract exercise but has real implications for such increasingly relevant topics as animal welfare, artificial intelligence, and cybernetics |
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| وصف مادي: | x, 252 p. ill. 23 cm |
| بيبلوغرافيا: | Includes bibliographical references (p. 221-244) and index |
| ردمك: | 019921929X 9780199219292 |