Studies in international corporate finance and governance systems a comparison of the U.S., Japan, and Europe

Corporate strategist Michael Porter states that the U.S. system of allocating capital both within and across companies appears to be failing because of both capital market and internal pressures on U.S. companies to underinvest in the relatively intangible assets that contribute to corporate capabil...

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Đã lưu trong:
Chi tiết về thư mục
Tác giả chính: Chew, Donald H.
Tác giả khác: Donald H. Chew
Ngôn ngữ:Undetermined
English
Được phát hành: New York Oxford University Press 1997
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Thư viện lưu trữ: Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Trà Vinh
Miêu tả
Tóm tắt:Corporate strategist Michael Porter states that the U.S. system of allocating capital both within and across companies appears to be failing because of both capital market and internal pressures on U.S. companies to underinvest in the relatively intangible assets that contribute to corporate capabilities. In contrast to Porter, financial economist Michael Jensen maintains that the most formidable challenge now facing the U.S. economy -- and, indeed, the economies of all industrialized nations -- is the corporate overinvestment problem, a problem that was addressed in the U.S. by the leveraged restructuring of the 1980s. Nobel-Prize economist Merton Miller answers both Porters concern about U.S. underinvestment and Jensens pessimism about U.S. control systems with a classic defense of the shareholder-value principle
Mô tả vật lý:vi, 378 p.
ill.
24 cm
số ISBN:0195107950
9780195107951