Knowledge and practical interests
Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. So whether a true belief is knowledge is not m...
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| Γλώσσα: | Undetermined English |
| Έκδοση: |
Oxford,New York
Clarendon Press,Oxford University Press
2007
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| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Trà Vinh |
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| Περίληψη: | Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. So whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. Stanley defends this thesis against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive (contextualism about knowledge attributions), and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim (relativism about knowledge)... |
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| Φυσική περιγραφή: | xi, 191 p. 21 cm |
| ISBN: | 0199230439 9780199230433 |