Ownership concentration and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective: Does national governance quality matter?

In this paper, the relationship between ownership concentration and financial performance of companies in Singapore and Vietnam is investigated in a dynamic framework. By focusing on two different types of national governance systems (well-developed vs. under-developed), we observe how the relations...

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Những tác giả chính: Nguyễn, Văn Tuấn, Locke, Stuart, Reddy, Krishna
Định dạng: Journal article
Ngôn ngữ:English
Được phát hành: Elsevier 2022
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Truy cập trực tuyến:http://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/handle/123456789/687
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1057521915001258
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spelling oai:scholar.dlu.edu.vn:123456789-6872022-08-02T03:28:21Z Ownership concentration and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective: Does national governance quality matter? Nguyễn, Văn Tuấn Locke, Stuart Reddy, Krishna Corporate governance Ownership structure Board structure National governance Singapore Vietnam In this paper, the relationship between ownership concentration and financial performance of companies in Singapore and Vietnam is investigated in a dynamic framework. By focusing on two different types of national governance systems (well-developed vs. under-developed), we observe how the relationship is moderated by the national governance quality. We find that the performance effect of concentrated ownership persists in these markets even after the dynamic nature of the ownership concentration–performance relationship is taken into consideration. Our finding supports the prediction of agency theory about the efficient monitoring effect of large shareholders in markets with highly concentrated ownership. In addition, we find that national governance quality does matter when explaining the ownership concentration–performance relationship. The positive effect of concentrated ownership on performance of firms operating in the under-developed national governance system (Vietnam) tends to be stronger than that in the well-established system (Singapore). This finding is consistent with the argument that ownership concentration is an efficient corporate governance mechanism which can substitute for weak national governance quality. Econometrically, our findings still hold even after controlling for dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity, and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, inherent in the corporate governance–performance relationship. 41 C 148-161 2022-07-19T12:38:24Z 2022-07-19T12:38:24Z 2015 Journal article Bài báo đăng trên tạp chí thuộc ISI, bao gồm book chapter http://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/handle/123456789/687 10.1016/j.irfa.2015.06.005 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1057521915001258 en International Review of Financial Analysis 1057-5219 Elsevier Netherlands
institution Thư viện Trường Đại học Đà Lạt
collection Thư viện số
language English
topic Corporate governance
Ownership structure
Board structure
National governance
Singapore
Vietnam
spellingShingle Corporate governance
Ownership structure
Board structure
National governance
Singapore
Vietnam
Nguyễn, Văn Tuấn
Locke, Stuart
Reddy, Krishna
Ownership concentration and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective: Does national governance quality matter?
description In this paper, the relationship between ownership concentration and financial performance of companies in Singapore and Vietnam is investigated in a dynamic framework. By focusing on two different types of national governance systems (well-developed vs. under-developed), we observe how the relationship is moderated by the national governance quality. We find that the performance effect of concentrated ownership persists in these markets even after the dynamic nature of the ownership concentration–performance relationship is taken into consideration. Our finding supports the prediction of agency theory about the efficient monitoring effect of large shareholders in markets with highly concentrated ownership. In addition, we find that national governance quality does matter when explaining the ownership concentration–performance relationship. The positive effect of concentrated ownership on performance of firms operating in the under-developed national governance system (Vietnam) tends to be stronger than that in the well-established system (Singapore). This finding is consistent with the argument that ownership concentration is an efficient corporate governance mechanism which can substitute for weak national governance quality. Econometrically, our findings still hold even after controlling for dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity, and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, inherent in the corporate governance–performance relationship.
format Journal article
author Nguyễn, Văn Tuấn
Locke, Stuart
Reddy, Krishna
author_facet Nguyễn, Văn Tuấn
Locke, Stuart
Reddy, Krishna
author_sort Nguyễn, Văn Tuấn
title Ownership concentration and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective: Does national governance quality matter?
title_short Ownership concentration and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective: Does national governance quality matter?
title_full Ownership concentration and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective: Does national governance quality matter?
title_fullStr Ownership concentration and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective: Does national governance quality matter?
title_full_unstemmed Ownership concentration and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective: Does national governance quality matter?
title_sort ownership concentration and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective: does national governance quality matter?
publisher Elsevier
publishDate 2022
url http://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/handle/123456789/687
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1057521915001258
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