Facts, values, and norms : essays toward a morality of consequence
In contrast to facts, values and morality seem insecure, influenced by illusion or ideology. How can we apply this same objectivity and accuracy to values and morality? In this collection, Peter Railton shows how a fairly sober, naturalistically informed view of the world might incorporate objective...
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Cambridge University
2013
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oai:scholar.dlu.edu.vn:DLU123456789-344722014-01-20T03:38:48Z Facts, values, and norms : essays toward a morality of consequence Railton, Peter Facts Values In contrast to facts, values and morality seem insecure, influenced by illusion or ideology. How can we apply this same objectivity and accuracy to values and morality? In this collection, Peter Railton shows how a fairly sober, naturalistically informed view of the world might incorporate objective values and moral knowledge Part I: Realism about Value and Morality 1 Moral Realism (1986) 3 2 Facts and Values (1986) 43 3 Noncognitivism about Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative (1993) 69 4 Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism (1997) 85 5 Red, Bitter, Good (1998) 131 Part II: Normative Moral Theory 6 Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality (1984) 151 7 Locke, Stock, and Peril: Natural Property Rights, Pollution, and Risk (1985) 187 8 How Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism (1988) 226 9 Pluralism, Dilemma, and the Expression of Moral Conflict (1992, 2001) 249 Part III: The Authority of Ethics and Value – The Problem of Normativity 10 On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action (1997) 29311 Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, but Not Hume Versus Kant (1999) 322 12 Morality, Ideology, and Reflection; or, the Duck Sits Yet (2000) 353 Index 385 2013-07-12T01:40:25Z 2013-07-12T01:40:25Z 2003 Book 9780511065415 http://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/34472 en application/pdf Cambridge University |
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Thư viện Trường Đại học Đà Lạt |
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English |
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Facts Values |
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Facts Values Railton, Peter Facts, values, and norms : essays toward a morality of consequence |
description |
In contrast to facts, values and morality seem insecure, influenced by illusion or ideology. How can we apply this same objectivity and accuracy to values and morality? In this collection, Peter Railton shows how a fairly sober, naturalistically informed view of the world might incorporate objective values and moral knowledge |
format |
Book |
author |
Railton, Peter |
author_facet |
Railton, Peter |
author_sort |
Railton, Peter |
title |
Facts, values, and norms : essays toward a morality of consequence |
title_short |
Facts, values, and norms : essays toward a morality of consequence |
title_full |
Facts, values, and norms : essays toward a morality of consequence |
title_fullStr |
Facts, values, and norms : essays toward a morality of consequence |
title_full_unstemmed |
Facts, values, and norms : essays toward a morality of consequence |
title_sort |
facts, values, and norms : essays toward a morality of consequence |
publisher |
Cambridge University |
publishDate |
2013 |
url |
http://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/34472 |
_version_ |
1757662692275912704 |