The Nature of Customary Law
A book on customary law, many modern lawyers might say, can have no relevance for them. And neither, many modern thinkers would echo, could it be of much interest. On many influential modern accounts, reliance on customary practices is a mark of inadequacy: acceptance of customs should beminimal...
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| Những tác giả chính: | , |
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| Định dạng: | Sách |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Cambridge University Press
2013
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| Những chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | http://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/35751 |
| Các nhãn: |
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| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Thư viện Trường Đại học Đà Lạt |
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| Tóm tắt: | A book on customary law, many modern lawyers might say, can have no
relevance for them. And neither, many modern thinkers would echo,
could it be of much interest. On many influential modern accounts,
reliance on customary practices is a mark of inadequacy: acceptance of
customs should beminimal and provisional since an unreflective attachment
to customary ways of thinking is inimical both to practical thought
and to political harmony. Modern societies and their legal systems
depend not on enslavement to customary habits and laws but on reasoned
principles and doctrines; customary laws grow up only where
legislators have done a particularly poor job, leaving a need for elaborate
statutory construction and legislative gap-filling. The more coherent
and consistent a legal system, the less the need for such customary
rules and practices: an interest in customary law reflects at worst what
Jeremy Bentham called the ‘sinister’ interests of self-interested reactionaries,
and at best the eccentric tastes of scholars, antiquarians and those
purporting to be international lawyers who work in what, on such
accounts, is really a lawless international world. |
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