Legislative Deferrals : Statutory Ambiguity, Judicial Power, and American Democracy
United States judges are criticized for making law when they should be following the laws made by elected officials. This book argues that much of the blame for judicial policymaking lies with elected officials. Legislators sometimes deliberately allow judges to make policy decisions because they wa...
Đã lưu trong:
| 主要作者: | |
|---|---|
| 格式: | 圖書 |
| 語言: | Undetermined |
| 出版: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2003
|
| 主題: | |
| 標簽: |
添加標簽
沒有標簽, 成為第一個標記此記錄!
|
| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Cần Thơ |
|---|
| 總結: | United States judges are criticized for making law when they should be following the laws made by elected officials. This book argues that much of the blame for judicial policymaking lies with elected officials. Legislators sometimes deliberately allow judges to make policy decisions because they want to avoid blame for making difficult choices. To demonstrate the importance of legislative deference, this study reexamines dramatic confrontations between Congress and the Supreme Court over labor policy in the early twentieth century. |
|---|