Legislative Deferrals : Statutory Ambiguity, Judicial Power, and American Democracy

United States judges are criticized for making law when they should be following the laws made by elected officials. This book argues that much of the blame for judicial policymaking lies with elected officials. Legislators sometimes deliberately allow judges to make policy decisions because they wa...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor Principal:	Lovell, George I
Formato:	Libro
Idioma:	Undetermined
Publicado:	Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2003
Những chủ đề:	Câu hỏi chính trị và quyền lực tư pháp,Thẩm phán-thực thi pháp luật,Phân chia quyền lực,Political questions and judicial power,Judge-made law,Legislative power,Separation of powers Quyền lập pháp Mỹ,Mỹ,Mỹ,Mỹ,United States,United Sates,United Sates,United States
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Thư viện lưu trữ:	Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Cần Thơ

Descripción
Tóm tắt:	United States judges are criticized for making law when they should be following the laws made by elected officials. This book argues that much of the blame for judicial policymaking lies with elected officials. Legislators sometimes deliberately allow judges to make policy decisions because they want to avoid blame for making difficult choices. To demonstrate the importance of legislative deference, this study reexamines dramatic confrontations between Congress and the Supreme Court over labor policy in the early twentieth century.

Legislative Deferrals : Statutory Ambiguity, Judicial Power, and American Democracy

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