Moral fictionalism

Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions--propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Non-cognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the...

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Tác giả chính: Kalderon, Mark Eli
Tác giả khác: Mark Eli Kalderon
Ngôn ngữ:Undetermined
English
Được phát hành: Oxford,New York Clarendon Press,Oxford University Press 2005
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Thư viện lưu trữ: Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Trà Vinh
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520 |a Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions--propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Non-cognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our non-cognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded as something to be debunked by philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and makes public our noncognitive attitudes. The realist fiction might be understood as a philosophical misconception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical 
650 |a Ethics; Philosophy 
700 |a Mark Eli Kalderon 
980 |a Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Trà Vinh