Moral fictionalism
Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions--propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Non-cognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the...
Enregistré dans:
| Auteur principal: | Kalderon, Mark Eli |
|---|---|
| Autres auteurs: | Mark Eli Kalderon |
| Langue: | Undetermined English |
| Publié: |
Oxford,New York
Clarendon Press,Oxford University Press
2005
|
| Sujets: | |
| Tags: |
Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|
| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Trà Vinh |
|---|
Documents similaires
-
The theory of moral sentiments
par: Smith, Adam
Publié: (2013) -
The myth of morality
par: Joyce, Richard
Publié: (2013) -
Philosophie morale
par: Bernard Guillemain
Publié: (1951) -
Kant's search for the supreme principle of morality
par: Kerstein, Samuel J
Publié: (2013) -
Making moral sense: Beyond Habermas and Gauthier
par: Gunnarsson, Logi
Publié: (2013)


