An incentives and contracts
This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in th...
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| Ngôn ngữ: | Undetermined English |
| Được phát hành: |
Oxford,New York
Oxford University Press
2001
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| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Trà Vinh |
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| Tóm tắt: | This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. This updated second edition substantially extends the exercises that test students' understanding of the material covered in each section |
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| Mô tả vật lý: | xiv, 287 p. ill. 25 cm |
| số ISBN: | 0199243255 9780199243259 |