An incentives and contracts
This is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in th...
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| 言語: | Undetermined English |
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Oxford,New York
Oxford University Press
2001
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| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Trà Vinh |
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