Hume's problem Induction and the justification of belief
In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a...
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| שפה: | Undetermined English |
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Oxford,New York
Clarendon Press,Oxford University Press
2003
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הוספת תג
אין תגיות, היה/י הראשונ/ה לתייג את הרשומה!
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| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Trà Vinh |
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