Hume's problem Induction and the justification of belief
In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a...
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| Ngôn ngữ: | Undetermined English |
| Được phát hành: |
Oxford,New York
Clarendon Press,Oxford University Press
2003
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| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Trung tâm Học liệu Trường Đại học Trà Vinh |
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| Tóm tắt: | In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory suggests that Hume's argument is flawed. However, Colin Howson argues that there is no flaw and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion; he also offers a solution to one of the central problems of Western philosophy, the problem of induction |
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| Mô tả vật lý: | 261 p. 23 cm |
| số ISBN: | 019825038X 9780198250388 |