Arms, Economics and British Strategy : From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs
The starting point for this study of British defence policy between 1904 and 1969 is the tendency for the costs of new weapons systems to rise more rapidly than the national income.1 Three main insights are offered. First, British defence policy was based upon technological innovation. Second, r...
Đã lưu trong:
| Tác giả chính: | |
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| Định dạng: | Sách |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Cambridge University Press
2013
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| Những chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/35580 |
| Các nhãn: |
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| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Thư viện Trường Đại học Đà Lạt |
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| Tóm tắt: | The starting point for this study of British defence policy between 1904
and 1969 is the tendency for the costs of new weapons systems to rise
more rapidly than the national income.1 Three main insights are offered.
First, British defence policy was based upon technological innovation.
Second, reductions in the size of the armed forces to accommodate new
weapons systems in defence budgets were not evidence of a decline in
power. Third, British grand strategy, incorporating economic as well as
military responses to external threats, was much more ambitious than is
commonly believed. |
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