Arms, Economics and British Strategy : From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs

The starting point for this study of British defence policy between 1904 and 1969 is the tendency for the costs of new weapons systems to rise more rapidly than the national income.1 Three main insights are offered. First, British defence policy was based upon technological innovation. Second, r...

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Tác giả chính: Peden, G. C
Định dạng: Sách
Ngôn ngữ:English
Được phát hành: Cambridge University Press 2013
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Truy cập trực tuyến:http://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/35580
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Thư viện lưu trữ: Thư viện Trường Đại học Đà Lạt
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spelling oai:scholar.dlu.edu.vn:DLU123456789-355802014-01-19T23:45:10Z Arms, Economics and British Strategy : From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs Peden, G. C Economics Strategy The starting point for this study of British defence policy between 1904 and 1969 is the tendency for the costs of new weapons systems to rise more rapidly than the national income.1 Three main insights are offered. First, British defence policy was based upon technological innovation. Second, reductions in the size of the armed forces to accommodate new weapons systems in defence budgets were not evidence of a decline in power. Third, British grand strategy, incorporating economic as well as military responses to external threats, was much more ambitious than is commonly believed. 2013-09-17T01:57:36Z 2013-09-17T01:57:36Z 2007 Book 978-0-511-29474-7 http://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/35580 en application/pdf Cambridge University Press
institution Thư viện Trường Đại học Đà Lạt
collection Thư viện số
language English
topic Economics
Strategy
spellingShingle Economics
Strategy
Peden, G. C
Arms, Economics and British Strategy : From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs
description The starting point for this study of British defence policy between 1904 and 1969 is the tendency for the costs of new weapons systems to rise more rapidly than the national income.1 Three main insights are offered. First, British defence policy was based upon technological innovation. Second, reductions in the size of the armed forces to accommodate new weapons systems in defence budgets were not evidence of a decline in power. Third, British grand strategy, incorporating economic as well as military responses to external threats, was much more ambitious than is commonly believed.
format Book
author Peden, G. C
author_facet Peden, G. C
author_sort Peden, G. C
title Arms, Economics and British Strategy : From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs
title_short Arms, Economics and British Strategy : From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs
title_full Arms, Economics and British Strategy : From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs
title_fullStr Arms, Economics and British Strategy : From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs
title_full_unstemmed Arms, Economics and British Strategy : From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs
title_sort arms, economics and british strategy : from dreadnoughts to hydrogen bombs
publisher Cambridge University Press
publishDate 2013
url http://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/35580
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