The Nature and Authority of Precedent
Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of...
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| Tác giả chính: | |
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| Định dạng: | Sách |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Cambridge University Press
2013
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| Những chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/35989 |
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| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Thư viện Trường Đại học Đà Lạt |
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| Tóm tắt: | Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers
and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There
is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent
but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions
in favour of precedent-following. This book examines the force and the
limitations of these arguments and shows that although the principal
requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier
judicial decisions on materially identical facts, the doctrine also requires
courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate
legal error or injustice. Not only do judicial precedents not
‘bind’ judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they
would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. Combining historical
inquiry and philosophical analysis, this book will assist anyone seeking to
understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine. |
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