The Nature and Authority of Precedent
Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of...
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Cambridge University Press
2013
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| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/35989 |
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oai:scholar.dlu.edu.vn:DLU123456789-359892014-01-19T23:18:53Z The Nature and Authority of Precedent Duxbury, Neil Authority Precedent Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of precedent-following. This book examines the force and the limitations of these arguments and shows that although the principal requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier judicial decisions on materially identical facts, the doctrine also requires courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate legal error or injustice. Not only do judicial precedents not ‘bind’ judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. Combining historical inquiry and philosophical analysis, this book will assist anyone seeking to understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine. 2013-12-18T08:42:39Z 2013-12-18T08:42:39Z 2008 Book 978-0-511-39484-3 https://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/35989 en application/pdf Cambridge University Press |
| institution |
Thư viện Trường Đại học Đà Lạt |
| collection |
Thư viện số |
| language |
English |
| topic |
Authority Precedent |
| spellingShingle |
Authority Precedent Duxbury, Neil The Nature and Authority of Precedent |
| description |
Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers
and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There
is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent
but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions
in favour of precedent-following. This book examines the force and the
limitations of these arguments and shows that although the principal
requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier
judicial decisions on materially identical facts, the doctrine also requires
courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate
legal error or injustice. Not only do judicial precedents not
‘bind’ judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they
would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. Combining historical
inquiry and philosophical analysis, this book will assist anyone seeking to
understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine. |
| format |
Book |
| author |
Duxbury, Neil |
| author_facet |
Duxbury, Neil |
| author_sort |
Duxbury, Neil |
| title |
The Nature and
Authority of Precedent |
| title_short |
The Nature and
Authority of Precedent |
| title_full |
The Nature and
Authority of Precedent |
| title_fullStr |
The Nature and
Authority of Precedent |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Nature and
Authority of Precedent |
| title_sort |
nature and
authority of precedent |
| publisher |
Cambridge University Press |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
https://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/35989 |
| _version_ |
1819809104637460480 |