Outside Director Compensation in German Public Family Firms: An Empirical Analysis
Pascal Engel investigates how outside directors are incentivized in family firms that are publicly listed but still partly owned by members of the founding family. Owning families significantly influence their firms' corporate conduct with their own set of goals, sometimes in conflict with econ...
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| Định dạng: | Sách |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
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Springer
2015
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| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/59509 |
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oai:scholar.dlu.edu.vn:DLU123456789-595092023-11-11T06:42:57Z Outside Director Compensation in German Public Family Firms: An Empirical Analysis Engel, Pascal Germany Family-owned business enterprises Stock companies Executives Pascal Engel investigates how outside directors are incentivized in family firms that are publicly listed but still partly owned by members of the founding family. Owning families significantly influence their firms' corporate conduct with their own set of goals, sometimes in conflict with economically driven goals of the capital markets. The author analyzes how family shareholders exert their influence on compensation schemes of outside directors who have the difficult task to protect the interests of family and non-family shareholders. This book provides insights on current approaches of defining a compensation scheme that attracts qualified outside directors but concurrently reflects respective shareholders' preferences. 2015-12-25T03:04:46Z 2015-12-25T03:04:46Z 2015 Book 978-3-658-07316-9 978-3-658-07315-2 https://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/59509 en application/pdf Springer |
| institution |
Thư viện Trường Đại học Đà Lạt |
| collection |
Thư viện số |
| language |
English |
| topic |
Germany Family-owned business enterprises Stock companies Executives |
| spellingShingle |
Germany Family-owned business enterprises Stock companies Executives Engel, Pascal Outside Director Compensation in German Public Family Firms: An Empirical Analysis |
| description |
Pascal Engel investigates how outside directors are incentivized in family firms that are publicly listed but still partly owned by members of the founding family. Owning families significantly influence their firms' corporate conduct with their own set of goals, sometimes in conflict with economically driven goals of the capital markets. The author analyzes how family shareholders exert their influence on compensation schemes of outside directors who have the difficult task to protect the interests of family and non-family shareholders. This book provides insights on current approaches of defining a compensation scheme that attracts qualified outside directors but concurrently reflects respective shareholders' preferences. |
| format |
Book |
| author |
Engel, Pascal |
| author_facet |
Engel, Pascal |
| author_sort |
Engel, Pascal |
| title |
Outside Director Compensation in German Public Family Firms:
An Empirical Analysis |
| title_short |
Outside Director Compensation in German Public Family Firms:
An Empirical Analysis |
| title_full |
Outside Director Compensation in German Public Family Firms:
An Empirical Analysis |
| title_fullStr |
Outside Director Compensation in German Public Family Firms:
An Empirical Analysis |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Outside Director Compensation in German Public Family Firms:
An Empirical Analysis |
| title_sort |
outside director compensation in german public family firms:
an empirical analysis |
| publisher |
Springer |
| publishDate |
2015 |
| url |
https://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/59509 |
| _version_ |
1782547201407320064 |