Judicial Reasoning Under the UK Human Rights ACT
A number of commentators have pointed out that the inception of Bills of Rights tends to have the effect, as in Canada, of requiring courts to grapple with justifications for rights and freedoms, taking a more philosophical approach to legal reasoning as they attempt to resolve conflicts between...
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| Những tác giả chính: | , , |
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| Định dạng: | Sách |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Cambridge University Press
2013
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| Những chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | http://scholar.dlu.edu.vn/thuvienso/handle/DLU123456789/35759 |
| Các nhãn: |
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| Thư viện lưu trữ: | Thư viện Trường Đại học Đà Lạt |
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| Tóm tắt: | A number of commentators have pointed out that the inception of Bills
of Rights tends to have the effect, as in Canada, of requiring courts to
grapple with justifications for rights and freedoms, taking a more philosophical
approach to legal reasoning as they attempt to resolve conflicts
between individual rights and competing societal and individual
interests.1 When countries adopt a document setting out a list of human
rights with special constitutional status (‘a Bill of Rights’), the effect on
judicial reasoning tends to be dramatic – as it was in Canada when it
adopted the Charter of Rights. In 2000, the Human Rights Act came into
force – affording the European Convention on Human Rights further
effect in domestic law – and, while it does not have the entrenched status
of other Bills of Rights, there is agreement that it does have what
‘constitutional’ status UK law allows.2 |
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